Authentication is a well-studied area of classical cryptography: a sender A and a receiver B sharing a classical private key want to exchange a classical message with the guarantee that the message has not been modified or replaced by a dishonest party with control of the communication line. In this paper we study the authentication of messages composed of quantum states.
Introduction
Until recently, the expression "quantum cryptography" referred mostly to quantum key distribution protocols [5, 4, 13] . However, these words now refer to a larger set of problems. While QKD and many other quantum protocols attempt to provide improved security for tasks involving classical information, an emerging area of quantum cryptography attempts instead to create secure protocols for tasks involving quantum information. One standard cryptographic task is the authentication of messages: A transmits some information to B over an insecure channel, and they wish to be sure that it has not been tampered with en route. When the message is classical, and A and B share a random private key, this problem can be solved by, for instance, the Wegman-Carter scheme [12] . In this paper, we discuss the analogous question for quantum messages.
A naive approach If we assume A and B share a private quantum key in the form of m EPR pairs, as well as some private classical key, there is a straightforward solution to this problem: A simply uses quantum teleportation [6] to send her message to Bob, authenticating the 2m classical bits transmitted in the teleportation protocol. If A and B initially share only a classical key, however, the task is more difficult. We start with a simple approach: first distribute EPR pairs (which might get corrupted in transit), and then use entanglement purification [7] to establish clean pairs for teleportation. This can be improved: we do not need a full-scale entanglement purification protocol, which produces good EPR pairs even if the channel is noisy; instead we only need something we call a purity testing protocol, which checks that EPR pairs are correct, but does not attempt to repair them in case of error.
Unfortunately, any such protocol will have to be interactive, since A must first send some qubits to Band then wait for confirmation of receipt before completing the transmission. This is unsuitable for situations in which a message is stored and must be checked for authenticity at a later time. Also, this interactive protocol achieves something stronger than what is required of a quantum authentication scheme: at the end of the purity-testing based scheme, both Alice and Bob know that the transmission was successful, whereas for authentication, we only require that Bob knows.
Contributions
In this paper we study non-interactive quantum authentication schemes with classical keys. Our primary contributions are:
• Formal definition of authentication for quantum states In classical authentication, one simply limits the probability that the adversary can make any change to the state without detection. This condition is too stringent for quantum information, where we only require high fidelity to the original state. We state our definition in terms of the transmission of pure states (section 3), but also show that the same definition implies security for mixed or entangled states.
• Construction of efficient purity testing protocols
We show how to create purity-testing protocols using families of quantum error-correcting codes with a particular covering property, namely that any Pauli error is detected by most of the codes in the family. We construct an efficient such family based on projective geometry, yielding a purity-testing protocol requiring only O(s) (classical) bits of communication, where s is the security parameter (section 4).
Purity-testing codes have not explicitly appeared before in the literature, but have been present implicitly in earlier work, for instance [15, 19] . To prove our purity-testing protocols secure, we use a "quantum-to-classical" reduction, due to Lo and Chau [15] . Subsequently to our work, Ambainis, Smith, and Yang [3] used our construction of purity-testing protocols in a study of more general entanglement extraction procedures.
• Construction of non-interactive quantum authentication schemes (QAS) We show that a secure non-interactive QAS can be constructed from any purity-testing protocol derived, as above, from QECCs (section 5). In particular, for our family of codes, we obtain an authentication scheme which requires sending m + s qubits, and consuming 2m + O(s) bits of classical key for a message of m qubits. The proof techniques in the Shor and Preskill paper [19] serve as inspiration for the transformation from an interactive purity-testing protocol to a non-interactive QAS.
• Study of the relation between encryption and authentication One feature of our authentication protocol is that it completely encrypts the quantum message being sent. We show that this is a necessary feature of any QAS(section 6), in striking contrast to the situation for classical information, where common authentication schemes leave the message completely intelligible. It therefore follows that any authentication protocol for an m-qubit message must use nearly 2m bits of classical key, enough to encrypt the message. The protocol we present approaches this bound asymptotically.
• Impossibility of digitally signing quantum states Since authentication requires encryption, it is impossible to create digital signature schemes for quantum messages: any protocol which allows one recipient to read a message also allows him or her to modify it without risk of detection, and therefore all potential recipients of an authenticated message must be trustworthy (section 7). This conclusion holds true even if we require only computationally secure digital signatures. Note that this does not in any way preclude the possibility of signing classical messages with or without quantum states [14] .
Why should we prefer a scheme with classical keys to a scheme with entangled quantum keys? The task of authenticating quantum data is only useful in a scenario where quantum information can be reliably stored, manipulated, and transmitted over communication lines, so it would not be unreasonable to assume quantum keys. However, many manipulations are easier with classical keys. Certainly, the technology for storing and manipulating them is already available, but there are additional advantages. Consider, for example, public key cryptography; it is possible to sign and encrypt classical key bits with public key systems, but signing a general quantum state is impossible. Thus, quantum keys would be unsuitable for an asymmetric quantum authentication scheme such as the one we describe in section 5.1.
Preliminaries

Classical Authentication
In the classical setting, an authentication scheme is defined by a pair of functions A : K × M → C and B : K × C → M × {valid, invalid} such that for any message µ ∈ M and key k ∈ K we have completeness
and that for any opponent algorithm O, we have soundness
where t = lg #C − lg #M is the security parameter creating the tradeoff between the expansion of the messages and the security level. Note that we only consider information-theoretically secure schemes, not schemes that are based on computational assumptions.
Wegman and Carter [12] introduced several constructions for such schemes; their most efficient uses keys of size only 4(t + lg lg m) lg m and achieves security 1 − 2 −t+2 . This compares rather well to the known lower bound of t + lg m − lg t for such a result [12] . The same work also introduced a technique to re-use an authentication function several times by using one-time-pad encryption on the tag, so that an opponent cannot learn anything about the particular key being used by A and B. Thus, at a marginal cost of only t secret key bits per authentication, the confidentiality of the authentication function h is guaranteed and thus may be re-used (a polynomial number of times).
For the remainder of this paper, we assume the reader is familiar with the basic notions and notation of quantum computing. These can be found in textbooks such as [16] . Since we rely heavily on terminology and techniques from quantum error correction (especially stabilizer codes), appendix A provides a summary of the relevant notions.
Purification and purity testing
Quantum error-correcting codes (QECCs) may be used for entanglement purification ( [7] ). In this setting, A and B share some Bell states (say |Φ + = |00 +|11 ) which have been corrupted by transmission through a noisy quantum channel. They want a protocol which processes these imperfect EPR pairs and produces a smaller number of higher-quality pairs. We assume that A and B have access to an authenticated, public classical channel. At the end of the protocol, they either accept or reject based on any inconsistencies they have observed. As long as A and B have a noticeable probability of accepting, then conditioned on accepting, the state they share should have fidelity almost 1 to the pure state |Φ + ⊗m . Moreover, small amounts of noise in their initial shared state should not cause failure of the protocol.
Stabilizer codes can be particularly useful for purification because of the following observation: for any stabilizer code Q, if we measure the syndrome of one half of a set of Bell states |Φ + ⊗n and obtain the result y, then the result is the state |Φ + ⊗m , with each of its two halves encoded in the coset with syndrome y. (Moreover, in this case the distribution on y is uniform.) If the original state is erroneous, A and B will likely find different syndromes, which will differ by the syndrome associated with the actual error.
Most purification protocols based on stabilizer codes require efficient error correction; we measure the syndrome, and use that information to efficiently restore the encoded state. However, one can imagine a weaker task in which Alice and Bob only want to test their EPR pairs for purity, i.e. they want a guarantee that if their pairs pass the test, their shared state will probably be close to |Φ + ⊗m . In that case, we can use the code for error detection, not correction, and need only be able to encode and decode efficiently from the space Q.
Encryption of Quantum Messages
A useful ingredient for much recent work in quantum cryptography is the concept of quantum teleportation, put forward by Bennett et al [6] . After A and B have shared a singlet state, A can later secretly send a single qubit in an arbitrary quantum state ρ to B by measuring her half of the singlet state together with her state ρ in the Bell basis to get two classical bits b 0 , b 1 . As a result, B's half of the singlet state will become one of four possibilities
, then B can easily recover ρ. Now without the bits b 0 , b 1 , the state ρ ′ reveals no information about ρ. Thus, one can turn this into an encryption scheme which uses only a classical key: after A and B have secretly shared two classical bits b 0 , b 1 , A can later secretly send a single qubit in an arbitrary quantum state ρ to B by sending him a qubit in state ρ ′ as above. This is called a quantum one-time pad (QOTP). This scheme is optimal [1, 9] : any quantum encryption (with a classical key) must use 2 bits of key for every transmitted qubit.
Quantum Authentication
At an intuitive level, a quantum authentication scheme is a keyed system which allows A to send a state ρ to B with a guarantee: if B accepts the received state as "good", the fidelity of that state to ρ is almost 1. Moreover, if the adversary makes no changes, B should always accept, and the fidelity should be exactly 1.
Of course, this informal definition is impossible to attain. The adversary might always replace A's transmitted message with a completely mixed state. There would nonetheless be a small probability that B would accept, but even when he did accept, the fidelity of the received state to A's initial state would be very low.
The problem here is that we are conditioning on B's acceptance of the received state; this causes trouble if the adversary's a priori chances of cheating are high. A more reasonable definition would require a tradeoff between B's chances of accepting, and the expected fidelity of the received system to A's initial state given his acceptance: as B's chance of accepting increases, so should the expected fidelity.
It turns out that there is no reason to use both the language of probability and that of fidelity here: for classical tests, fidelity and probability of acceptance coincide. With this in mind we first define what constitutes a quantum authentication scheme, and then give a definition of security: Definition 1 A quantum authentication scheme (QAS) is a pair of polynomial time quantum algorithms A and B together with a set of classical keys K such that:
• A takes as input an m-qubit message system M and a key k ∈ K and outputs a transmitted system T of m + t qubits.
• Note that B may well have measured the qubit V to see whether or not the transmission was accepted or rejected. Nonetheless, we think of V as a qubit rather than a classical bit since it will allow us to describe the joint state of the two systems M, V with a density matrix.
There are two conditions which should be met by a quantum authentication protocol. On the one hand, in the absence of intervention, the received state should be the same as the initial state and B should accept.
On the other hand, we want that when the adversary does intervene, B's output systems have high fidelity to the statement "either B rejects or his received state is the same as that sent by A". One difficulty with this is that it is not clear what is meant by "the same state" when A's input is a mixed state. It turns out that it is sufficient to define security in terms of pure states; one can deduce an appropriate statement about fidelity of mixed states (see Appendix B).
Given a pure state |ψ ∈ H M , consider the following test on the joint system M, V : output a 1 if the first m qubits are in state |ψ or if the last qubit is in state |REJ (otherwise, output a 0). The projectors corresponding to this measurement are
We want that for all possible input states |ψ and for all possible interventions by the adversary, the expected fidelity of B's output to the space defined by P |ψ 1 is high. This is captured in the following definition of security. 
where " E k " means the expectation when k is chosen uniformly at random from K. The QAS has soundness error ǫ for |ψ if:
A QAS is secure with error ǫ if it is secure with error ǫ for all states |ψ .
Note that our definition of completeness assumes that the channel connecting A to B is noiseless in the absence of the adversary's intervention. This is in fact not a significant problem, as we can simulate a noiseless channel using standard quantum error correction.
Interactive protocols In the previous section, we dealt only with non-interactive quantum authentication schemes, since that is both the most natural notion, and the one we achieve in this paper. However, there is no reason to rule out interactive protocols in which A and B at the end believe they have reliably exhanged a quantum message. The definitions of completeness and soundness extend naturally to this setting: as before, B's final output is a pair of systems M, V , where the state space of V is spanned by |ACC , |REJ . In that case ρ Bob is B's density matrix at the end of the protocol, averaged over all possible choices of shared private key and executions of the protocol. The soundness error is ǫ, where Tr P |ψ 1 ρ Bob ≥ 1 − ǫ.
Purity Testing Codes
An important tool in our proof is the notion of a purity testing code, which is a way for A and B to ensure that they share (almost) perfect EPR pairs. We shall concentrate on purity testing codes based on stabilizer QECCs.
Definition 3 A stabilizer purity testing code with error ǫ is a set of stabilizer codes
That is, for any error x in the error group, if k is chosen later at random, the probability that the code Q k detects x is at least 1 − ǫ.
Definition 4 A purity testing protocol with error ǫ is a superoperator T which can be implemented with local operations and classical communicaiton, and which maps 2n qubits (half held by A and half held by B) to 2m + 1 qubits and satisfies the following two conditions:
Completeness: T (|Φ + ⊗n ) = |Φ + ⊗m ⊗ |ACC 1 We make no assumptions on the running time of the adversary.
Soundness: Let P be the projection on the subspace spanned by |Φ + ⊗m ⊗ |ACC and |ψ ⊗ |REJ for all |ψ . Then T satisfies the soundness condition if for all ρ,
The obvious way of constructing a purity testing protocol T is to start with a purity testing code {Q k }. When Alice and Bob are given the state ρ, Alice chooses a random k ∈ K and tells it to Bob. They both measure the syndrome of Q k and compare. If the syndromes are the same, they accept and perform the decoding procedure for Q k ; otherwise they reject.
Proposition 1
If the purity testing code {Q k } has error ǫ, then T is a purity testing protocol with error ǫ.
The proof appears in Appendix C.
An Efficient Purity Testing Code
Now we will give an example of a particularly efficient purity testing code. We will use the stabilizer techniques of section A, restricting to the case n = rs. We will construct a set of codes Q k each encoding m = (r −1)s qubits in n qubits, and show that the Q k form a purity testing code. (Note that the construction below works just as well if instead of qubits, we use registers with dimension equal to any prime power; see appendix D for details.) Using qubits in groups of s allows us to view our field GF (2 2rs ) as both a 2r-dimensional vector space over GF (2 s ) and a 2rs-dimensional binary vector space. We need a symplectic form that is compatible with this decomposition. One possibility is
where Tr(z) = 2rs−1 i=0 z 2 i is the standard trace function, which maps GF (2 2rs ) onto GF (2). We consider a normal rational curve in P G(2r − 1, 2 s ) (the projective geometry whose points are the 1-d subspaces of the 2r-dimensional vector space over GF (2 s )). (See, e.g., the excellent introductory text [8] .) Such a curve is given by:
(The colon is used to separate the coordinates of a projective point, indicating that only their ratio matters.) Thus, there are 2 s + 1 points on the normal rational curve.
Since each "point" of this curve is actually a one-dimensional subspace over GF (2 s ), it can also be considered as an s-dimensional binary subspace Q k in a vector space of dimension 2rs = 2n. We will show that Q k is totally isotropic with respect to the symplectic inner product (1), and encodes m = n − s qubits in n qubits.
Theorem 2
The set of codes Q k form a stabilizer purity testing code with error
Each code Q k encodes m = (r − 1)s qubits in n = rs qubits.
Proof of this is in Appendix D.
Protocols
In this section we describe a secure non-interactive quantum authentication scheme (Protocol 5.2) which satisfies the definition of section 3. In order to prove our scheme secure, we begin with a purity testing protocol as per Section 4 (summarized as Protocol 5.1). The security of this protocol follows from Prop. 1. We then perform several transformations to the protocol that strictly preserve its security and goals but which remove the interaction, replacing it with a shared private key. We thus obtain two less interactive intermediate protocols (Protocols E.1 and E.2) and a final protocol (Protocol 5.2), which is completely non-interactive. The transformations are similar in flavor to those of Shor and Preskill [19] , who use the technique to obtain a simple proof of the security of a completely different task, namely the BB84 [5] quantum key exchange scheme. 3: B announces that he has received the n qubits.
4:
A picks a random k ∈ K, and announces it to B. Following the notation of Section 4, let P be the projector onto the subspace described by "either B has aborted or the joint state held by A and B is |Φ + ⊗m ". Let ρ AB be the joint density matrix of A and B's systems. Then Prop. 1 states that at the end of step 6, Tr(P ρ AB ) is exponentially close to 1 in n. The soundness of our first authentication protocol follows immediately:
5:
Corollary 3 If A and B are connected by an authenticated classical channel, then Protocol 5.1 is a secure interactive quantum authentication protocol, with soundness error exponentially small in n.
The proof is straightforward; we give it explicitly in Appendix E.
Theorem 4
When the purity testing code {Q k } has error ǫ, the protocol 5.2 is a secure quantum authentication scheme with key length O(n + log 2 (#K)) and soundness error ǫ. In particular, for the purity testing code described in Section 4.1, the authentication scheme has key length 2m + s + log 2 (2 s + 1) ≤ 2n + 1 and soundness error 2n/[s(2 s + 1)], where m is the length of the message in qubits, s is the security parameter, and A sends a total of n = m + s qubits.
Proof: From Corollary 3 we have that Protocol 5.1 is a secure interactive authentication protocol. We show that Protocol 5.2 is equivalent to Protocol 5.1, in the sense that any attack on Protocol 5.2 implies an equally succesful attack on Protocol 5.1. To do so, we proceed by a series of reductions; the details appear in Appendix E. 
Public Key Quantum Authentication
Unlike its classical counterpart, quantum information can be authenticated in a public key setting but not in a way that can be demonstrated to a judge. In section 6, we show the impossibility of a digital signature scheme for quantum information; here, we instead introduce the notion of public key quantum authentication. Let E b , D b be B's public and private keyed algorithms to a PKC resistant to quantum computers' attacks. Let S a , V a be A's private and public keyed algorithms to a digital signature scheme resistant to quantum computers' attacks. These may be either be protocols which are secure with respect to a computational assumption [17] or with unconditional security [14] . To perform authentication, A picks secret and random binary strings k, x, and y, and uses them as keys to q-authenticate ρ as ρ ′ . A encrypts and signs the key as σ := S a (E b (k|x|y)). A sends ρ ′ , σ to B. To verify a state, B verifies A's signature on σ using V a and then discovers the key k, x and y using his private decryption function D b . B checks that ρ ′ is a valid q-authenticated message according to key k, x, y, and recovers ρ.
Good Authentication Implies Good Encryption
One notable feature of any protocol derived using Theorem 4 is that the information being authenticated is also completely encrypted. For classical information, authentication and encryption can be considered completely separately, but in this section we will show that quantum information is different. While quantum states can be encrypted without any form of authentication, the converse is not true: any scheme which guarantees authenticity must also encrypt the quantum state almost perfectly.
To show this, let us consider any fixed authentication scheme. Denote by ρ |ψ the density matrix transmitted in this scheme when Alice's input is |ψ . Let ρ
|ψ denote the density matrix for key k.
Definition 5
An encryption scheme with error ǫ for quantum states hides information so that if ρ 0 and ρ 1 are any two distinct encrypted states, then the trace distance
We claim that any good QAS must necessarily also be a good encryption scheme. That is:
Theorem 5 (Main Lower Bound) A QAS with error ǫ is an encryption scheme with error at most 4ǫ 1/6 .
Corollary 6
A QAS with error ǫ requires at least 2m(1 − poly(ǫ)) classical key bits.
We prove this corollary in Appendix F. For now, we concentrate on the Theorem 5.
The intuition behind the proof of this main theorem is that measurement disturbs quantum states, so if the adversary can learn information about the state, she can change the state. More precisely, if the adversary can distinguish between two states |0 and |1 , she can change the state |0 + |1 to |0 − |1 . An extreme version of this situation is contained in the following proposition: Proposition 7 Suppose that there are two states |0 , |1 whose corresponding density matrices ρ |0 , ρ |1 are perfectly distinguishable. Then the scheme is not an ǫ-secure QAS for any ǫ < 1.
Proof: Since ρ |0 , ρ |1 can be distinguished, they must have orthogonal support, say on subspaces V 0 , V 1 . So consider an adversary who applies a phaseshift of −1 conditioned on being in V 1 . Then for all k, ρ
However, in general, the adversary cannot exactly distinguish two states, so we must allow some probability of failure. Note that it is sufficient in general to consider two encoded pure states, since any two mixed states can be written as ensembles of pure states, and the mixed states are distinguishable only if some pair of pure states are. Furthermore, we might as well let the two pure states be orthogonal, since if two nonorthogonal states |ψ 0 and |ψ 1 are distinguishable, two basis states |0 and |1 for the space spanned by |ψ 0 and |ψ 1 are at least as distinguishable.
Given the space limitations of this abstract, we outline the proof with a sequence of lemmas, whose proofs are contained in Appendix F.
We first consider the case when |0 and |1 can almost perfectly be distinguished. In that case, the adversary can change |0 + |1 to |0 − |1 with high (but not perfect) fidelity (stated formally in Lemma 16). When |0 and |1 are more similar, we first magnify the difference between them by repeatedly encoding the same state in multiple copies of the authentication scheme, then apply the above argument.
Lemma 8 Suppose that there are two states
Then the scheme is not ǫ-secure for |ψ = |0 + |1 for any ǫ < 1 − 2η.
When two states can be distinguished, but only just barely, the above lemma is not sufficient. Instead, we must magnify the distinguishability of the states |0 and |1 by repeating them by considering the tensor product of many copies of the same state. The probability of distinguishing then goes to 1 exponentially fast in the number of copies:
We create these repeated states by encoding them in an iterated QAS consisting of t copies of the original QAS (with independent values of the key for each copy).
Lemma 10
Suppose we iterate the scheme t times. Let |ψ = Note that the proof of this lemma goes through the following crucial claim, which follows from a simple hybrid argument.
Claim 11 (Product states)
The iterated scheme is tǫ-secure for any product state.
Putting the various lemmas together, we find that, given two states |0 and |1 which are slightly distinguishable by the adversary, so D(ρ 0 , ρ 1 ) ≥ δ, then in the iterated scheme, |000...0 and |111...1 are more distinguishable: D(ρ |000...0 , ρ |111...1 ) ≥ 1 − η, where η ≤ 2 exp(−tδ 2 /2). Since the iterated scheme is 10t 3 ǫ-secure for the state |ψ = 1 √ 2 (|000...0 + |111...1 ), then by the first lemma,
Quantum Signatures
One consequence of the previous theorem is that digitally signing quantum messages is impossible. One can imagine more than one way of defining this task, but any reasonable definition must allow a recipientwho should not be able to alter signed messages-to learn something about the contents of the message. However, this is precisely what is forbidden by the previous theorem: in an information-theoretic setting, any adversary who can gain a non-trivial amount of information must be able to modify the authenticated state with non-negligible success.
If we consider computationally secure schemes, a somewhat narrower definition of digitally signing quantum states remains impossible to realize. If we assume a quantum digital signature protocol should allow any recipient to efficiently extract the original message, then a simple argument shows that he can also efficiently change it without being detected, contradicting the security of the scheme. Namely: Assume that there is transformation U with a small circuit which extracts the original message ρ, leaving auxiliary state |ϕ (which may not all be held by Bob). In order to preserve any entanglement between ρ and a reference system, the auxiliary state |ϕ must be independent of ρ. Therefore, Bob can replace ρ with any other state ρ ′ and then perform U † on ρ ′ and his portion of |ϕ , producing a valid signature for ρ ′ . This is an efficient procedure: the circuit for U † is just the circuit for U executed backwards.
Note that we have actually shown a somewhat stronger result: it is not possible, even when the sender is known to be honest, to authenticate a quantum message to a group of receivers (some of whom may be dishonest). This presentation also makes some limitations of our proof clear. For instance, the proof does not apply if the sender knows the identity of the quantum state he is signing, nor does it apply to signing classical messages.
Discussion and Conclusion
An interesting feature of our scheme: if the transmission quantum channel is not error free, we can modify our scheme to take advantage of the error-correction capability of the quantum code. More precisely, if B rejects only when the number of observed errors is too large then error correction will fix natural noise or tampering of small amplitude.
We have examined various aspects of the problem of authenticating quantum messages. We have shown the security of a large class of private-key quantum authentication schemes, and presented a particular highly efficient scheme from that class. One feature of the scheme is that it completely encrypts the message, and we show that this is a necessary feature of any quantum message authentication code: if any observer can learn a substantial amount of information about the authenticated state, that observer also has a good chance of successfully changing the state without being detected. We have also studied authentication of quantum states in a public key context, and shown that while authentication is possible with public keys, digitally signing quantum states is never possible, even when only computational security is required.
The necessity for encryption is rather surprising, given that classical messages can be authenticated without encrypting them. The difference can be understood as a complementarity feature of quantum mechanics: authenticating a message in one basis requires encrypting it in the complementary Fourier-transformed basis. This is essentially another realization of the principle that measuring data in one basis disturbs it in any complementary basis. For classical messages, therefore, encryption is not required: only one basis is relevant. In contrast, for quantum messages, we require authentication in all bases and therefore we must also require encryption in all bases.
Note that purity-testing codes have many applications beyond QAS. For instance, the efficient puritytesting code of section 4 can be used to create a correspondingly efficient QKD protocol.
[ 
A Quantum Stabilizer Codes
A quantum error-correcting code (QECC) is a way of encoding quantum data (say m qubits) into n qubits (m < n) such that the encoded data is protected from errors of small weight: the code is said to correct t errors if any operator which affects less than t qubits of the encoding can be corrected without disturbing the encoded state. Usually the goal in the construction of codes is to maximize this minimum distance for particular m, n. However, in this paper, we use the theory developed for those purposes to construct families of codes with a different type of property. For now, we review the necessary theory on a very general class of codes known as stabilizer codes. Our construction is based on a class of QECCs for q-dimensional registers, with q = p n a prime power (later we will specialize to the case where p = 2, so each register consists of n qubits). A basis for the set of all operators on the p-dimensional Hilbert space is the "shift/phase" error basis on p-dimensional Hilbert space, defined via E ab = X a Z b , where i|X|j = δ i,j+1 , i|Z|j = ξ i δ i,j , for ξ = exp(2πi/p) a primitive pth root of unity, are the standard-basis matrix elements of the "shift by one" and "ramp the phase by one" operators. (Here, indices are in Z p .) This basis has a simple multiplication rule: E ab E a ′ b ′ = ξ a ′ b E a+a ′ ,b+b ′ . Thus, {ξ c E ab } is a group containing a basis for the whole operator space for one register. If we have n registers, we can simply use the tensor product E of n copies of this operator group; each element corresponds to a 2n-dimensional vector, and the vectors x = (a|b), y = (a ′ |b ′ ) come from commuting operators iff their symplectic inner product is 0 in Z p :
A stabilizer code is a QECC given by an Abelian subgroup S of E, which does not contain any multiples of the identity other than I itself. S can be described by the set of 2n-dimensional vectors x such that E x ∈ S. This will be a subspace of Z 2n p . Moreover, it will be totally isotropic, i.e. B(x, y) = 0 for all x, y in the subspace. If we take a set of generators for S, we can divide Hilbert space into a set of equidimensional orthogonal subspaces. Each such space T consists of common eigenvectors of all operators of S having a fixed pattern of eigenvalues, unique to T . The space with all eigenvalues +1 is the "code space," its elements are "codewords," and the orthogonal spaces are labelled by "syndromes."
Note that one can also view B(·, ·) as a symplectic form over GF (p 2n ), by choosing a set of generators for GF (p 2n ) as a vector space over Z p . By choosing different sets of generators for GF (p 2n ) as a vector space over Z p , we can get different symplectic forms B(·, ·) over this finite vector space. By judicious choice of the generators, one can make B(·, ·) correspond to any non-degenerate symplectic form over GF (p 2n ).
Undetectable errors
We can classify errors which lie in E into three categories: The errors corresponding to elements of Q are not truly errors-they leave the codewords unchanged. Errors which fail to commute with some element of Q move codewords into a subspace orthogonal to the code, so can be detected by the QECC. The remaining errors, those which commute with all elements in S but are not themselves in S, are the undetectable errors of the code. Thus, if Q ⊥ is the space of vectors y for which B(x, y) = 0 for all x ∈ Q, the set of undetectable errors is just Q ⊥ − Q.
Syndromes Note that specifying the subgroup S by a set Q of elements of GF (p 2n ) isn't quite enough: operators differing by a phase ξ c correspond to the same field element, but yield different QECC's in the Hilbert space. Given an s-dimensional totally isotropic subspace of Z 2n p , there are p s possible choices of phases for the group S, which produce p s different QECCs. However, all these codes have identical error correction properties. The corresponding code subspaces are all orthogonal and of the same dimension p n−s . These codes are known as cosets of the code S, defined as the standard choice with all phases equal to 1. 2 The choice of phases is known as the syndrome (because errors outside S ⊥ map the code into a different coset, and the syndrome therefore gives information about which error occurred). Measuring the syndrome projects a quantum state into one of these codes.
B Alternative Security Definition
The definition of security of an authentication scheme given in Section 3 appears at first sight to have a major shortcoming: it does not tell what happens when A's input is a mixed state. Intuitively, this should not be a problem, since one expects security to extend from pure states to mixed states more or less by linearity. Indeed, this is the case, but it is not entirely clear what is meant by security when A's input is a mixed state ρ. One straightforward approach is to add a reference system R, and to assume the joint system of A and R is always pure; then the requirement is that the final state of B and R should high fidelity to the initial state. We could also use the following informal definition, which we will show is implied by Definition 2: as long as B's probability of acceptance is significant, then when he accepts, the fidelity of the message state he outputs to A's original state should be almost 1.
Proposition 12
Suppose that (A, B, K) is a ǫ-secure QAS. Let ρ be the density matrix of A's input state and let ρ ′ be the density matrix output by B conditioned on accepting the transmission as valid. Then if B's probability of accepting is p acc , the fidelity of ρ to ρ ′ is bounded below. For any ρ and any adversary action O, we have:
In particular, if ǫ is negligible and p acc is non-negligible, then the fidelity of B's state to A's input state will be essentially 1.
To prove this, we first restate Proposition 12 more formally. Let ρ Bob be the state of A's two output systems M, V when A's input is ρ. Denote the projector onto the space of accepting states by Π, that is
Using this notation, B's probability of accepting is p acc = Tr(Πρ Bob ), and the density matrix of the joint system M, V conditioned on acceptance is ρ acc = Πρ Bob Π Tr(Πρ Bob ) = Πρ Bob Π pacc . Now since ρ acc has been restricted to the cases where B accepts, we can write ρ acc = ρ ′ ⊗ |ACC ACC|, where ρ ′ is the density matrix of B's message system conditioned on his acceptance of the transmission as valid. From the definition of fidelity, we can see that
2 Actually, the "standard" coset also depends on the selection of a basis of generators for S.
We can now restate the theorem: Claim (Proposition 12): Theorem 12) : Write ρ = i p i |ψ i ψ i | for some orthonormal basis {|ψ i }. For each i, let ρ i be B's output when A uses input |ψ i . We have ρ Bob = i p i ρ i .
For each i, let P i = |ψ i ψ i | ⊗ |ACC ACC| and let Q i = (I M − |ψ i ψ i |) ⊗ |ACC ACC| so that
Now we can write ρ ⊗ |ACC ACC| = i p i P i , and ρ acc = i p i
Πρ i Π pacc . By the concavity of fidelity (Theorem 9.7 of [16]), we get
The formula for fidelity for one-dimensional projectors is simple: for a projector P and any density matrix σ, we have F (P, σ) = Tr(P σ). Thus expression (5) simplifies to
Using the fact that ΠP i Π = P i , we can further simplify this:
is always less than 1, we can obtain a lower bound by removing the square root sign:
Now the acceptance probability p acc = Tr(Πρ Bob ) can be written as i p i Tr(Πρ i ). Using the fact that
But by the definition of ǫ-security, we know that for each i, we have Tr (Q i ρ i ) ≤ ǫ, and so p acc ≤ ( i p i Tr (P i ρ i )) + ǫ, and so we get ( i p i Tr (P i ρ i )) ≥ p acc − ǫ. Applying this observation to expression (6), we get :
C Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 states that a stabilizer purity testing code can always be used to produce a purity testing protocol with the same error ǫ. Proof: If A and B are given n EPR pairs, this procedure will always accept, and the output will always be |Φ + ⊗m . Thus, T satisfies the completeness condition. Suppose for the moment that the input state is (E x ⊗ I)|Φ + ⊗n , for E x ∈ E, x = 0. Then when k is chosen at random, there is only probability ǫ that x ∈ Q ⊥ k − Q k . If x / ∈ Q ⊥ k , then A and B will find different error syndromes, and therefore reject the state. If x ∈ Q ⊥ k , then A and B will accept the state, but if x ∈ Q k , then the output state will be |Φ + ⊗m anyway. Thus, the probability that A and B will accept an incorrect state is at most ǫ.
To prove the soundness condition, we can use this fact and a technique of Lo and Chau [15] . The states (E x ⊗ I)|Φ + ⊗n form the Bell basis for the Hilbert space of A and B. Suppose a nonlocal third party first measured the input state ρ in the Bell basis; call this measurement B. Then the argument of the previous paragraph would apply to show the soundness condition. In fact, it would be sufficient if Alice and Bob used the nonlocal measurement Q k ⊗Q k which compares the Q k -syndromes for A and B without measuring them precisely. This is a submeasurement of the Bell measurement B -that is, it gives no additional information about the state. Therefore it commutes with B, so the sequence B followed by Q k ⊗ Q k is the same as Q k ⊗ Q k followed by B, which therefore gives probability at least 1 − ǫ of success for general input states ρ. But if the state after Q k ⊗ Q k gives, from a Bell measurement, |Φ + ⊗m or |REJ with probability 1 − ǫ, then the state itself must have fidelity 1 − ǫ to the projection P . Therefore, the measurement Q k ⊗ Q k without B satisfies the soundness condition. Moreover, A and B's actual procedure T is a refinement of Q k ⊗Q k -that is, it gathers strictly more information. Therefore, it also satisfies the soundness condition, and T is a purity testing protocol with error ǫ. 2
D Analysis of Purity-Testing Code Construction
It is straightforward to extend the purity testing code defined in Section 4.1 to arbitrary finite fields GF (q).
To do so, we work over a global field GF (q 2rs ) and break it down into both a 2r-dimensional vector space over GF (q s ) and a 2rs-dimensional vector space over GF (q). We exploit this by defining our GF (2)-valued symplectic form B via a choice of a GF (q s )-valued symplectic form C on GF (q 2rs ) and a non-null linear map L : GF (q s ) → GF (q), where linearity is defined by viewing GF (q s ) as an s-dimensional vector space over GF (q). Then B(x, y) := L(C(x, y)) .
Bilinearity and alternation of B are obvious. For fixed y(x), by C's nondegeneracy there is a z such that C(z, y)(C(x, z)) = 0. Considering αz in place of z, for all scalars α ∈ GF (2 s ), and still holding y(x) fixed, shows (by bilinearity of C) that C(x, y) takes all values in GF (q s ) as x(y) is varied; by non-nullity of L, not all of these can map to zero, i.e. B is nondegenerate. The definition of the purity testing code {Q k } is then the same as in the binary case.
Theorem 13
Each code Q k encodes m = (r − 1)s dimension q registers in n = rs registers.
We must show (a) that Q k is totally isotropic, and (b) that the error probability is at most ǫ.
(a) For α, β ∈ GF (2 s ), we have
Fix an x ∈ Q k − {0}. Every y ∈ Q k may be written as αx, for some α ∈ GF (q s ). Now C(x, x) = 0. So, B(αx, βx) = 0, i.e., Q k is totally isotropic under the symplectic form B.
(b) We must find, for an arbitrary error E x (which can be described via a 2n-dimensional GF (q) vector x), an upper bound on the number of Q ⊥ k − Q k it can belong to. It will be sufficient to bound the number of Q ⊥ k the error can belong to, since |Q k | is small compared to |Q ⊥ k | in our context. x ∈ Q ⊥ k means B(x, y) = 0 for all y ∈ Q k . By choice of s linearly independent y ∈ Q k this imposes s linearly independent linear equations on x. We will show below that if we take any 2r codes Q k defined by points on Υ, and take s independent vectors from each, the resulting set of 2rs vectors is linearly independent. Thus if E x is undetectable in 2r such codes, this imposes the dimension's worth (2rs) of linearly independent equations on x. Consequently, E x must be detectable in all the remaining codes, i.e., E x can satisfy x ∈ Q ⊥ k for at most 2r values of k, when Q k are chosen among the q s + 1 available s-dimensional spaces corresponding to points on Υ. Thus, the {Q k } form a purity testing code with error
We now show the claimed property of codes defined by Υ. A set of points in a projective geometry of dimension d−1 are said to be in general position if any d (= dimension of the underlying vector space, when, as in our case, such exists) of them are linearly independent. The points on the normal rational curve Υ are in general position, and indeed a maximal set of such points. (To verify that they are in general position one shows that for any 2r points on the curve, the determinant of the matrix of their coordinates is nonzero; these are Vandermonde determinants.) That is, any 2r points on Υ are linearly independent. Each point k on Υ corresponds to an s-dimensional code Q k , consisting of 2rs-dimensional vectors. Let z be any nonzero element of Q k . As α ranges over GF (q s ), αz ranges over all vectors in Q k . Thus, if any vector from Q k is a linear combination of vectors from other codes {Q j }, than all of Q k is also a linear combination of vectors from {Q j }, and k is linearly dependent on the points {j} of Υ. So if we take any 2r codes Q k , and take s independent vectors from each, the resulting set of 2rs vectors is linearly independent.
E Proof of secure authentication
Corollary 3 states that the interactive authentication protocol 5.1 is secure.
Proof (of Corollary 3):
The completeness of the protocol can be seen by inspection: in the absence of intervention, A and B will share the Bell states |Φ + ⊗m at the end of step 6 and so after the teleportation in step 7 B's output will be exactly the input of A.
To prove soundness, suppose that A's input is a pure state |ψ . Intuitively, at the end of step 6, A and B share something very close to |Φ + ⊗m , and so after the teleportation in step 7 either B's output will be very close to A's input, or he will reject because of interference from the adversary.
More formally, after step 6, the joint state ρ AB satisfies Tr(P ρ AB ) ≥ 1 − ǫ. At this point, by assumption the only thing that the adversary can do is attempt to jam the communication between A and B. Thus the effect of step 7 will be to map the subspace given by P into the subspace given by P |ψ 1 . Consequently, at the end of the protocol, B's output density matrix will indeed lie almost completely in the subspace defined by P 
4:
A announces k and the syndrome y of Q k to B. 
5:
4:
A announces k, x, and y to B.
5: B measures the syndrome y
′ of the code Q k . B compares y to y ′ , and aborts if they are different. B decodes his n-qubit word according to Q k , obtaining τ ′ . B q-decrypts τ ′ using x and obtains ρ ′ .
these actions do not depend on B's feedback. This will not change any of the states transmitted in the protocol or computed by Bob, and so both completeness and soundness will remain the same. PROTOCOL E.1 → PROTOCOL E.2: There are two changes between Protocols E.1 and E.2. First, note that measuring the first qubit of a state |Φ + and obtaining a random bit c i is equivalent to choosing c i at random and preparing the pure state |c i ⊗ |c i . Therefore, instead of preparing the state |Φ + ⊗n and measuring the syndrome of half of it, A may as well choose the syndromes s at random and encode both halves of the state |Φ + ⊗m using the code Q k and the syndrome s.
Second, rather than teleporting her state ρ to B using the EPR halves which were encoded in Q s 1 ,s 2 , A can encrypt ρ using a quantum one-time pad (QOTP) and send it to B directly, further encoded in Q k . These behaviours are equivalent since either way, the encoded state is σ t 1 x σ t 2 z ρσ t 2 z σ t 1 x , where t 1 and t 2 are random n-bit vectors. PROTOCOL E.2 → PROTOCOL 5.2: In Protocol 5.2, all the random choices of A are replaced with the bits taken from a secret random key shared only by her and B. This eliminates the need for an authenticated classical channel, and for any interaction in the protocol. This transformation can only increase the security of the protocol as it simply removes the adversary's ability to jam the classical communication. To get a sense of the proof, consider the following proposition:
Proposition 15 Suppose that there are two states |0 , |1 whose corresponding density matrices ρ |0 , ρ |1 are perfectly distinguishable. Then the scheme is not an ǫ-secure QAS for any ǫ < 1.
|0 −|1 . Thus, Bob will decode the (orthogonal) state |0 − |1 . 2
Lemma 16 Suppose that there are two states
Proof (of Lemma 16):
Let ρ 0 = ρ |0 and ρ 1 = ρ |1 . Consider the Hermitian matrix σ = ρ 0 − ρ 1 . We can diagonalize σ. Let V 0 be the space spanned by eigenvectors with non-negative eigenvalues and let V 1 be the orthogonal complement.
Since 1/2 Tr|σ| ≥ 1−η, but Tr σ = 0, we know that
Consider an adversary who applies a phaseshift of −1 conditioned on being in V 1 . Fix a particular key k.
. We know that the expected values of p 0 and p 1 are both at least 1 − η.
Claim 17 When the input state is
(|0 + |1 ), the fidelity of Bob's output to the state
Proof: Consider some reference system R which allows us to purify the states ρ We want to show that |ψ is close to a correct encoding of
After the transformation, we obtain
We can substitute for the first line in terms of p 0 and p 1 , which are real. The second line is purely imaginary.
Bob's decoding can only increase the fidelity of the two states, as can discarding the reference system, proving the claim. 2
Thus, for a specific value k of the key, F (ρ (k) , (|0 + |1 ). Fidelity is concave, so by
Jensen's inequality the fidelity of the average density matrix ρ = 1 |K| k ρ (k) is at least the average of the fidelities for each k. That is,
In other words, the adversary can change the state
(|0 + |1 ) with probability at least 1 − 2η. 2
When two states can be distinguished, but only just barely, the above lemma is not sufficient. Instead, we must magnify the distinguishability of the states |0 and |1 by repeating them by considering the tensor product of many copies of the same state. The probability of distinguishing then goes to 1 exponentially fast in the number of copies: 
Proof (of Lemma 18):
We can bound D(ρ ⊗t 0 , ρ ⊗t 1 ) by giving a test which distinguishes them very well. We know there exists a measurement given by spaces V 0 , V 1 such that Tr(V 0 ρ 0 ) − Tr(V 0 ρ 1 ) = δ. Consider the test which performs this measurement on t independent copies of ρ 0 or ρ 1 . The test outputs 0 if more than (Tr(V 0 ρ 0 ) + Tr(V 0 ρ 1 ))/2 of the measurements produce 0.
By the Chernoff bound, the probability that this test will make the wrong guess is at most exp(−tδ 2 /2). Thus, D(ρ We create these repeated states by encoding them in an iterated QAS consisting of t copies of the original QAS (with independent values of the key for each copy).
Lemma 19
Claim 20 (Product states)
Proof (of Claim 20):
For simplicity we prove the claim for the state |000...0 . The same proof works for any product pure state (and in fact for separable states in general).
Intuitively, an adversary who modifies the state |000...0 must change some component of the state. We can formalize this by rewriting the projector P Since P
is positive, for all ρ, we have
Similarly, for larger values of t we have
Tr(P
Thus the iterated scheme is tǫ-secure for |000...0 (and in fact for all product states). 2
Proof (of Lemma 19):
Consider the net superoperator due to encoding, decoding, and the adversary's intervention, i.e. O net = 1 |K| k B k O adv A k . By introducing an ancilla system R, we can extend this superoperator to a linear transformation on the joint system M ⊗ R ⊗ V (where M is the message system and V is Bob's verifcation qubit). For a pure state |ψ , write its image as |ψ |γ |ψ |ACC + |β |ψ |REJ + |δ |ψ |ACC where |δ |ψ is a joint state of M R which is orthogonal to the subspace |ψ ⊗ R. , and let |γ i = |γ |ψ i and |δ i = |δ |ψ i .
Claim 21
For all i = 0, ..., t − 1, we have If Alice now sends K to Bob, he is able to (almost always) decode the message M . His failure probability is a polynomial in ǫ, so he has received 2m(1 − poly(ǫ)) bits of information, and therefore K must consist of at least 2m(1 − poly(ǫ)) classical bits or half as many qubits.
In fact, K might as well be classical: Bob's decoding method will be to immediately measure K, since he is expecting a classical key, and therefore Alice might as well have measured K before sending it; naturally, this actually means she includes entangled qubits in the purification R. We thus restrict K to classical bits and prove the corollary.
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